February 5, 2026
Date: February 5, 2026
Time: 11 am to 12 pm
Location: TBC
You have been invited to appear at PROC for one hour on the Committee's study on Foreign Election Interference.
While the motion adopted by the committee specifies that you be invited on the implementation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR), it is expected that you will receive broader questions related to the full scope of the study on foreign interference. Your briefing package includes key messages that reflect this wider scope and provides clear, factual context to support your appearance before the Committee.
In the previous Parliament, the Committee conducted three studies on foreign interference, including election interference, questions of privilege involving Members of Parliament, and cyberattacks on MPs. Testimony from national security officials, election administrators, legal experts, and technology specialists underscored the growing sophistication of foreign actors seeking to influence Canada's democratic processes.
Witnesses identified persistent vulnerabilities, including weak information sharing between security agencies and Parliament, limited transparency in digital political advertising, and the absence of mandatory disclosure of foreign influence activities. They emphasized the need to modernize legislative frameworks, strengthen cybersecurity for MPs and parliamentary systems, and hold social media platforms accountable. The implementation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR) was repeatedly cited as essential to deterring covert influence and maintaining public trust.
In the current Parliament, officials from the department have already appeared on this study. During their appearance they gave an update on the implementation of the FITR as well as the ongoing work to establish the Office of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner, develop regulations, and build the registry's IT infrastructure. While progress is active, members expressed concern over delays, missed timelines, and the absence of a confirmed commissioner, urging greater transparency on the expected launch date. During the meeting they also described the evolving threat landscape, including transnational repression, disinformation campaigns, and targeted intimidation, especially within diaspora communities.
In the coming weeks, Deputy Minister Tricia Geddes will be appearing on February 3, 2026 as a member of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel, alongside other panel members Nathalie G. Drouin, National Security Intelligence Advisor to the PM, and David Morrison, Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada (TBC). Representatives of the RCMP and CSIS will be appearing as members of the SITE Task Force alongside officials from Global Affairs Canada and Communications Security Establishment Canada on February 10, 2026.
You will be appearing with the following officials:
At the beginning of the meeting, the Chair will invite you to deliver opening remarks lasting approximately 5 minutes.
Your proposed opening remarks highlights the effective plan the Government of Canada has put in place to protect the last federal election; that no major foreign interference event was determined to have compromised the election's integrity; and, that the government is continuing to implement measures to protect our democracy, with a focus on the next steps for the implementation of FITAA.
Questions from Committee members will follow with the rounds of questions to be as follows:
First Round of Questions:
Second and Subsequent Rounds of Questions:
That, further to the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, June 12, 2025, the committee undertake a study respecting foreign interference, provided that:
February 5, 2026
Ottawa, Ontario
Mr. Chair, colleagues, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee on this subject.
It is becoming abundantly clear that the world is becoming more dangerous and divided.
The order that underpinned global prosperity for decades is undergoing a profound transformation driven by geopolitical realignment and technological change.
These changes mean the threat landscape Canada faces is rapidly evolving.
Our adversaries are actively seeking to exploit vulnerabilities in this shifting landscape. Their goal?
To undermine our society and advance their own interests.
Canadians expect their government to protect their democracy and uphold western liberal democratic principles.
That includes ensuring fair, transparent elections.
Our approach is working: the integrity of the most recent federal election was not compromised by foreign interference.
That was thanks to our comprehensive election security framework, including continuous intelligence monitoring and assessment of foreign interference threats throughout the election period.
Our government has taken steps to ensure existing measures against foreign interference are effective, and to take other measures where necessary.
At the same time, it is critical that we maintain transparency and accountability.
Throughout the last election period, Public Safety Canada and Elections Canada, along with national security agencies—including CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP —worked in constant coordination.
That collaboration was critical in the successful defence of our democratic processes in the last general election.
Our agencies worked to detect covert foreign interference activities as well as monitor foreign state actors who would seek to undermine public confidence in Canadian democracy.
Additionally, for the first time during a federal general election, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force provided weekly technical briefings to the media that helped sensitize and educate Canadians about the threats that could impact the election.
In short, our election infrastructure and systems were constantly protected.
And I'll reiterate: our safeguards functioned as designed, and the integrity of the federal election was not compromised.
In the event of a foreign interference threat, a non-partisan process called the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, established in 2019, is in place to inform Canadians.
Even in non-election periods, our government and our national security partners remain ready.
Our environment is constantly evolving—threats have become more sophisticated, more covert, and more persistent.
We continue to examine our approach and seek improvements—striving for more efficient detection and greater transparency.
We have made significant progress.
That includes advancing work to bring the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act into force.
This Act strengthens transparency regarding foreign influence activities, notably by naming Anton Boegman as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner, who will oversee the upcoming Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.
The Act also establishes an administrative monetary penalty regime to support enforcement and discourage violations.
On January 2nd, proposed regulations to implement the Act were published online for public consultation. Those consultations closed earlier this week.
The proposed regulations identify the information to be collected and published about foreign influence activities, set out administrative monetary penalties of up to $1 million, and establish how we will work with partners, at all levels of government, to uphold the Act.
I want to reassure all Canadians and my honourable colleagues that the establishment of the Registry remains a top priority. These are delicate and complex mechanisms that require deliberate and careful implementation. Equivalent systems in the Five Eyes took over 2 years to fully implement. We are on track.
These key initiatives make foreign influence transparent and safeguard the integrity of Canadian democracy.
The threat of foreign interference is complex., Standing up these new measures is being done with both urgency and care.
It is only through robust, careful planning that we will continue to be able to detect and manage threats.
We are committed to continuing our work of strengthening democratic resilience during elections and at all times.
This means remaining alert, adapting to new, rapidly evolving threats, and protecting Canadians.
Canada's democracy is strong, and we will continue taking action to protect it.
Thank you.
We're moving quickly to implement the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act.
We're building a strong, transparent framework to protect Canada's democracy—one that makes foreign influence visible, safeguards privacy, and enforces accountability with meaningful consequences.
We've made real progress. Intelligence systems are stronger, Parliamentarians are safer, communities are engaged, and law enforcement is ready to respond.
The Government of Canada successfully maintained the integrity of the 45th General Election.
We were prepared and introduced significant enhancements to our electoral safeguards ahead of the election period.
The regulations currently outline anyone who has an arrangement with a foreign principal to influence a Canadian political or governmental process will be required to register. The regulations include no further exemptions in addition to the diplomatic elements already outline in the Act.
The regulations were published in Canada Gazette Part I for a thirty-day comment period, which closed on February 2, 2026. The Government will incorporate this feedback to improve the regulations and ensure they align with the goals of FITAA. Public Safety (PS) continues to engage with diaspora communities, civil society, and privacy experts on a regular basis. Furthermore, these groups have been informed of the published regulations so that they may provide additional input.
The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation.
What is a foreign Principal?
What Constitutes a political or government process?
Exemptions to Registration:
Compliance Tools:
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 1: That mandatory information and training sessions on foreign interference threats, activities and tactics be made available to all members and their staff by the House of Commons, both as part of the Members' Orientation Program, and on a continual basis. These sessions ought to be developed by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security, working in collaboration with national security and intelligence agencies and partners, and the recognized parties. | Canada's national security partners brief Members of Parliament (MP) on threats and security measures as required. The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) develops tailored strategic assessments and briefings for Ministers and other Parliamentarians upon request, which are shared with security partners including the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms. |
| 2: That a contact person be assigned by the House of Commons Administration to liaise with members on all matters related to foreign interference threats | The National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC) is mandated to coordinate Government of Canada efforts to combat foreign interference (FI) by providing leadership to advance a unified federal response to FI actions, and increasing situational awareness and transparency through community engagement with domestic and international stakeholders and partners. This includes working with MPs, in conjunction with other national security partners. |
| 3: That the government work with recognized parties' whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying requirements for a "need to know," to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members. | The Government of Canada currently provides security clearances for those MPs who require it for the execution of their duties. CSIS will provide the appropriate security assessments as part of those individuals' clearance application processes, pursuant to s.13 of the CSIS Act. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has existing "duty to warn" policies in place, which may be used to inform Parliamentarians of threats and risks. As per the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians, issued in 2023, CSIS is required to ensure Parliamentarians are informed of threats directed at them in a manner that still allows CSIS to protect its sources and methodologies. Furthermore, the ITAC at CSIS provides strategic briefings to Parliamentarians on the national security threats they face. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 4: That the government instruct and work closely with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to provide improved and additional support to Parliament | As per the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians, issued in 2023, CSIS is required to ensure Parliamentarians are informed of threats directed at them in a manner that still allows CSIS to protect its sources and methodologies. In addition, amendments to the CSIS Act allow CSIS to more broadly share tailored information with Parliamentarians to build resilience before threats materialize, enabling Parliamentarians to make more informed decisions. The RCMP has existing "duty to warn" policies in place, which may be used to inform Parliamentarians of threats and risks. As per the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians, issued in 2023, CSIS is required to ensure Parliamentarians are informed of threats directed at them in a manner that still allows CSIS to protect its sources and methodologies. |
| 5: When a threat is identified, Canadian Security Intelligence Service must immediately and directly inform individual members about specific foreign interference threat activity which targets them, directly or indirectly, including information on the identity of the persons and/or entities involved in the threat activity. The briefing on the threat must include measures being taken to ensure their safety. Updated briefings must continue throughout the duration of the threat. | CSIS where appropriate, is authorized to undertake threat reduction measures, which may include briefing targeted individuals. Additionally, CSIS, including the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, regularly briefs Canadian parliamentarians on foreign interference threats, providing classified and unclassified updates to raise awareness about threats and developments. The RCMP has existing "duty to warn" policies in place, which may be used to inform Parliamentarians of threats and risks. As per the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians, issued in 2023, CSIS is required to ensure Parliamentarians are informed of threats directed at them in a manner that still allows CSIS to protect its sources and methodologies. |
| 6: The Speaker, under the guidance of the Sergeant-at-Arms, will work to create a clear protocol and a reasonable threshold about informing the whips of all recognized parties about foreign interference threats, who will then inform their members, with the Speaker contacting Independent members for the duration of the threat. Further, additional support must be provided to members and their offices. | CSIS where appropriate, is authorized to undertake threat reduction measures, which may include briefing targeted individuals. Additionally, CSIS, including the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, regularly briefs Canadian parliamentarians on foreign interference threats, providing classified and unclassified updates to raise awareness about threats and developments. The RCMP has existing "duty to warn" policies in place, which may be used to inform Parliamentarians of threats and risks. As per the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians, issued in 2023, CSIS is required to ensure Parliamentarians are informed of threats directed at them in a manner that still allows CSIS to protect its sources and methodologies. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 7: That the Canadian Security Intelligence Service undertake to improve and increase outreach to diaspora communities most impacted by foreign interference and intimidation, in order to increase public trust and transparency and create a space for Canadians who are harassed and intimidated by foreign entities to be able to come forward. | CSIS' Academic Outreach & Stakeholder Engagement maintains trusted relationships and regularly engages with national advocacy associations that represent the interest of diaspora communities in Canada. It has published guidance documents on Foreign Interference, available on its website, in nine languages. Additionally, CSIS actively supports the Office of the National Countering Foreign Interference Coordinator (ONCFIC), including through participation, throughout 2025, in workshops, across Canada, to meet with vulnerable communities and offer support and guidance on countering foreign interference and transnational repression. |
| 8: That the government encourage a culture change at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in respect of communicating about foreign interference threat activity to enable better targeted individuals and diaspora groups, and all Canadians, to identify, mitigate and overcome these efforts, and that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service report to the House on its progress about the culture change referred to in this recommendation in the service's annual report to Parliament under section 20.2(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. | CSIS continues to raise awareness of foreign interference threats targeting Canadians, including through the CSIS Director's public appearances and speeches, through CSIS publications and Annual Reports, and through the CSIS Academic Outreach & Stakeholder Engagement's ongoing community outreach efforts. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 9: That the government address concerns about systemic "over-classification" of intelligence products and analyses by revisiting its classification levels and processes for these documents, with a view to being more in line with transparency and disclosure practices of Canada's Five Eyes partners, and that the government report to the House, in a year's time, an update on its progress. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| 10: That the government undertake to lead a process to determine the declassification of information to enhance transparency. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 11: That the government urgently introduce legislation to establish a registry of foreign agents aimed at promoting transparency regarding foreign influence on Canadian soil, ensuring that governments, elected officials, and citizens have access to this registry. | The Government of Canada working diligently to bring the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) into force and to establish the registry of foreign influence activities. Candidates for the Commissioner position have been identified. Regulations were published on Canada Gazette, Part 1 on January 3, 2026 for a thirty-day comment period. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 12: That the government undertake a thorough national security review and create an updated national security strategy that defines the range of national security threats that Canada faces, the responses to those threats, and the manner in which the strategy fits into a democratic framework for a society engaging with these threats. | The Government of Canada will release a National Security Strategy for Canada before the end of Winter. |
| 13: That the government work with national security and law enforcement agencies to clarify and reconcile the definition of foreign interference threats. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 14: That the government conduct a legislation review to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act with a focus on foreign interference threats to national security and democratic institutions. | An Act respecting countering foreign interference made targeted amendments to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act. This better equips the Government of Canada to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today, including foreign interference. |
| 15: That the overdue statutory review of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act be undertaken by a committee of the House forthwith with a view that that committee be transformed into a joint parliamentary committee, along the lines of similar committees in the United Kingdom and the United States. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| 16: That the government introduce legislation to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act in order to permit greater sharing of information concerning foreign interference threat activity directed towards democratic institutions and processes with both Houses of Parliament, their committees, individual parliamentarians, federal recognized political parties, and provincial and municipal governments. | An Act respecting countering foreign interference made targeted amendments to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act. This legislation enabled broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners beyond the Government of Canada, with appropriate safeguards, to help partners build resiliency to threats. |
| 17: That the government urgently consider measures to address the "intelligence to evidence" challenge in law, policy and operations, so that charges of offences related to foreign interference threat activity may be prosecuted more effectively and frequently, and that the government report to the House, in a year's time, an update on its progress in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's annual report to Parliament under section 20.2(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 18: That the government review the position of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor and consider establishing a committee to focus on actionable intelligence. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| 19: That the government consider establishing a fixed five-year term for the role of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 20: That a cabinet committee on National Security and Foreign Interference regularly discuss matters pertaining to Canada's security interests. | Public Safety Canada, with our national security partners, regularly hold senior level governance committees that discuss pressing national security issues, and brief deputy and department Ministers as appropriate. |
| 21: That the government and its intelligence and national security agencies strengthen the internal governance and accountability process around the sharing of information and intelligence with relevant ministers and the Prime Minister. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| 22: That the government work with its national security agencies to establish clear lines of responsibility and recommendations on how to react to intelligence and the flow of information when intelligence becomes a threat. | Public Safety Canada, with our national security partners, regularly hold senior level governance committees that discuss pressing national security issues, and result in intelligence-driven actions to mitigate threats as they arise. |
| 23: That the government establish a clearer process for funneling intelligence to top officials (i.e., the most senior public service and political levels,) including greater accountability for ensuring that the right people see the right intelligence. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. |
| 24: That the government put in place tracking protocols to allow for a reconstruction of whom saw what document, and when. | The Government of Canada's classified intelligence systems allow for document tracking to confirm recipients, viewers and the chain of custody for physical documents. |
| 25: That the government consider establishing a position within the Privy Council Office with the power to flag important intelligence to the Prime Minister and other ministers. | The National Security and Intelligence Advisor, supported by the Privy Council Office (PCO), provides policy support to the Prime Minister, and the Clerk of the Privy Council. These efforts include briefing the Prime Minister and Clerk of the Privy Council as appropriate. |
| PROC Recommendation | Government of Canada Response |
|---|---|
| 26: An appropriate process be considered to provide security and intelligence briefing for election candidates. | CSIS may provide briefings to candidates where appropriate, and as directed by the Government of Canada. During the 45th General Election (GE45), the SITE TF and PCO briefed cleared political party representatives on the threat landscape for GE45, the role of the CEIPP Panel, as well as the Government of Canada's planned communications strategy for the upcoming election. Political party representatives were also provided with an update on the Candidate Security Program, which was launched for GE45. The program aimed to enhance the security posture of candidates on an as and when needed basis. Additionally, during GE45 ad hoc meetings were organized with political party representatives as required. |
| 27: That Elections Canada consider implementing an awareness campaign to reassure voters and the Canadian public that the electoral process in Canada is secure and that measures are in place to combat any attempt at foreign interference. Further, that it also educate citizens on how to identify foreign interference and where to report any suspicious activity. | CSIS may provide briefings to candidates where appropriate, and as directed by the Government of Canada. During GE45, the SITE TF and PCO briefed cleared political party representatives on the threat landscape for GE45, the role of the CEIPP Panel, as well as the Government of Canada's planned communications strategy for the upcoming election. Political party representatives were also provided with an update on the Candidate Security Program, which was launched for GE45. The program aimed to enhance the security posture of candidates on an as and when needed basis. Additionally, during GE45 ad hoc meetings were organized with political party representatives as required. |
| 28: That individuals involved in the work of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel, or any successor bodies, be adequately briefed, in advance of a general election, about ongoing or recent foreign interference threat activity targeting parliamentarians so that they might better appreciate the context of activities which could carry over into an election period. | The SITE TF and the CEIPP Panel are on the cutting edge of intelligence collection and analysis efforts during the federal election process. |
| 29: That the government amend the Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol with a view to empowering the non-partisan public servants on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (a) with greater discretion on whether to inform the public about events or incidents of foreign interference; and (b) with greater authority to direct national security agencies to directly brief candidates, political parties or Elections Canada, as the case may be, who are affected by events or incidents of foreign interference. | The Government of Canada is currently reviewing this recommendation. However, ahead of GE45, the Clerk of the Privy Council issued Guidance for Panel members for the implementation of the Cabinet Directive on the CEIPP. This Guidance directed the Panel to take note of whether and how the full range of actions available to the Government of Canada to safeguard against incidents that threaten Canada's ability to have a free and fair election have been considered. This included considerations related to communicating with Canadians and informing affected parties, such as candidates or political parties. |
The PIFI final report, released on January 28, 2025, included 51 recommendations covering a wide range of topics, including intelligence, roles and responsibilities, election security, and building societal resilience to foreign interference (FI) by expanding efforts to engage Canadians.
Following the release of the report, Privy Council Office (PCO) and Public Safety Canada (PS) led efforts to assess the report with a view to implementing the recommendations as well as identifying opportunities for additional efforts.
These efforts are in addition to other enhancements made to the Government's counter-FI posture. For example, in 2024 the Countering Foreign Interference Act was passed into law and modernized our laws and authorities in relation to foreign interference, malign foreign influence, and transnational repression, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) was issued a mandate letter to increase transparency, and the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC) has significantly expanded its engagement efforts with communities and other governments across Canada in 2024 and 2025.
PS is of the view that two-thirds of the recommendations have either been implemented or significant progress has been made towards implementation.
PS continues to work with federal partners to assess outstanding recommendations and identify how they can be meaningfully addressed in the context of current and future planned priorities, including a National Security Strategy and review of the current national security legislation.